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Preface
The aim of this thesis is to show an application to economics of some usual statistical
instruments very common in physics, or more generally a scientiﬁc method.
There is obviously no presumption of originality in this approach, as physics has a long
tradition of moving to ﬁelds apparently far from their subject. The cycle of lectures by
Erwin Schoredinger (1887-1961), which have been reported in the book What is life? [1]
by the physicist himself in 1944, is an important example. This book is probably the ﬁrst
attempt to explain what happens inside a body of a living being starting from physics
and chemistry concepts. It did not remain a futureless attempt, because it inspired other
physicists, such as Max Delbruck and Francis Crick, and it was an important contribution
to the birth of molecular biology.
As it emerges partially from this book, when a physicist tries to analyze situations far
from his main ﬁeld of application, his approach is his most important ally, rather than
physical laws he already knows. As proof of that we can stress that physics use to test
continuously their results through experiments, and the empirical results are usually the
basis for future theories. This proper characteristic of physics makes it an useful forma
mentis for studying complex systems, for which a pure mathematical axiomatic approach
can be too rigid to appreciate the complexity involved.
In this thesis we are not interested in listing all contributions of physicists to other
sciences, but we want to focus on a way to study systems with many entities interacting
with each other. This general problem is very common in physics, both in large scale
problems, such as many bodies gravitational systems, and in the small scale ones, such
as the Ising Model. As underlined in [2], Adam Smith (1723-1790) himself made the ﬁrst
attempt to formulate economical science, by modeling the society as a truly many-body
system of selﬁsh agents, each having no idea of benevolence or charity towards its fellow
neighbors, or having no foresight, can indeed reach an equilibrium where the economy
as a whole is most eﬃcient, leading to the best acceptable price for each commodity.
This research of the most eﬃcient situation, in the meaning of the most eﬃcient to all
participating agents, is known as the invisible hand determining the society dynamics,
and it predates the self-organization mechanism in physics of many-body systems.
Smith models the society as sum of interacting entities, acting to get a maximisation
of a quantity, i.e., the eﬃciency, and at the end an equilibrium is reached. All this
concepts are very common in Game Theory, which is properly an attempt to model
complex systems as a set of elements interacting with one another, following some rules,
in order to maximize some function, i.e. utility function.
Basic concepts of Game Theory are given in chapter 1, but we are now interested
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in highlighting that this theory is used in very diﬀerent ﬁelds, not only economics. As
reported by The Economist in 2011 [3], there have been many successful Game Theory
attempts to describe the behaviour of socio-political scenarios, e.g., the Egypt's President
Mubarak fall from power and the name of the successor of the Ayatollah Khomeini ﬁve
years before his death, both predictions given by Mr Bueno de Mesquit, who after other
right predictions was hired by foreign governments, America's State Department, Pen-
tagon and intelligence agencies. Again in biology, as argued in [4] and [5], we can regard
to the distribution of genetic alleles as the results of the competition among phenotypes,
which generates a selection pressure for optimal genotypes. This biological process can
be considered, more generally speaking, as the Darwin evolutionary description, which
asserts that the process of natural selection leads to the optimization of the reproductive
process.
Chapter 1 is devoted to give some basic concepts of Game Theory, in chapters 2
and 3 we get back to economic applications analyzing a model called Minority Game.
We have underlined some good results of Game Theory, now it is time to bring to light
diﬃculties which we encounter when we try to apply it: as written in [6], economics is
still a science in his infancy, so that not only we have not a universal theory, but we
are very far from it. As a consequence, only some aspects of economics can be treated
successfully through theory, in the mathematical sense, and all other ones are better
treated in a qualitative way. In addition, when we decide to face an economic problem
using a pure mathematical approach, we always have to remember that the initial problem
is never clearly formulated, and this is why, to minimize this probelm a previous qualitative
analysis is strictly necessary. To continue the comparison, when one builds a physical
theory, then usually one has the possibility to test it by experiments. In economics
this check is more diﬃcult to perform, because the empirical background is frequently
inadequate.
The model we analyze in depth in this thesis is the so-called Minority Game. This
model, which is introduced in chapter 2, is a game, in the proper sense given in chapter
1, in which a (odd) number of players can choose between two options, let us say buy and
sell, and each player will win if his choice is the minority one. Since losses are about twice
as painful as gains [7] in chapter 3 we make a little variation in order to modify the learning
scheme of agents in a simple version of the minority game [8] in order to diﬀerentiate their
behaviour depending on what occurred at the previous time step, i.e. gain or loss. In
chapter 4 conclusions about the analyzed variation of chapter 3 are summarized.
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Chapter 1
Introduction to Game Theory
Game Theory can be deﬁned as the study of mathematical models of conﬂict and co-
operation between rational decision-makers, who make decisions that will inﬂuence one
another's welfare. Basically these decision-makers are people forming a community, from
the social science perspective.
From the historical point of view, Zermelo, Borel, von Neumann and Morgenstern can
be considered as the founding fathers of the modern Game Theory. It is interesting to
notice that early works on Game Theory were done during the World War II in Princeton,
in the same community where many leaders of the theoretical physicists were working.
This fact is not a pure casual event, indeed the structure of these social problems is very
close to many statistical mechanics situations involving spatially extended systems. As
stressed in [10] interesting parallels between nonequilibrium phase transitions and spatial
evolutionary game theory have added another dimension to the concept of universality
classes.
The term game identiﬁes a situation of competition between two or more individu-
als acting according to some rules. This individuals are called players in this contest.
When we write rational we mean that every player makes decisions with the only aim of
maximizing his own payoﬀ, which is measured in some utility scale.
In order to have a rigorous approach to Game Theory we start from the Bayesian
Decision Theory, then we will generalize this theory to the case of two or more decision
makers. We will follow mainly the perspective by Myerson [11].
Very basic Decision Theory concepts are given, then we will proceed with a general
and deeper discussion on Game Theory itself.
1.1 Decision Theory
As we have already said Game Theory can be considered an extension of Decision Theory
to two or more players. From these considerations, without going into deep details, we are
now interested in getting main results of this theory in order to use them in the remainder
of this work.
At ﬁrst, given a ﬁnite set Z, we deﬁne the set of probability distributions ∆(Z) as
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∆(Z) = {q : Z −→ R|
∑
y∈Z
q(y) = 1 and q(z) ≥ 0,∀z ∈ Z} (1.1)
Given this deﬁnition, let we deﬁne X as the set of available prizes that the player
can get and Ω the set of possible states, one of which is the true state of the world. For
simplicity's sake we assume both X and Ω to be ﬁnite.
Given those sets we can deﬁne a lottery as any real and non-negative function from
every prize x in X and every (ﬁxed) state t in Ω, such that
∑
x∈X f(x|t) = 1. From these
deﬁnitions we see that f(x|t) is to be interpreted as the objective conditional probability of
getting prize x in lottery f if t is the state of the world. We denote L = {f : Ω→∆(X)}
as the set of all lotteries.
If we call event a non-empty subset of Ω, given two lotteries f and g in L, we write
f &S g iﬀ, in the opinion of the player, f would be at least as desirable as g if the event
S occurred. Given this relation we deﬁne
f ∼ g iﬀ f &S g and g &S f
f S g iﬀ f &S g and g S f
It is not diﬃcult to see that given f and g in L, αf + (1 − α)g is still a lottery that
selects f or g with probability α and 1 − α respectively. We denote α[x] + (1 − α)[y],
where [x](y|t) ≡ δx,y, the lottery that gives either prize x or y, with probabilities α and
(1− α) respectively. This lottery is a random lottery.
1.1.1 Axioms
All properties of a theory follow a list of axioms. Here these axioms are:
1. completeness: f &S g or g &S f
2. transitivity: if f &S g and g &S h, then f &S h
3. relevance: if f(·|t) = g(·|t) ∀t ∈ S, then f vS g
4. monotonicity: if f S h and 0 6 β < α 6 1, then αf + (1−α)h S βf + (1−β)h
5. continuity: if f &S g and g &S h, then ∃γ ∈ R such that 0 6 γ 6 1 and
g ∼S γf + (1− γ)h
6. objective substitution: if e &S f and g &S h and 0 6 α 6 1, then αe+(1−α)g &S
βf + (1− β)h
7. strict objective substitution: if e S f and g &S h and 0 < α 6 1, then
αe+ (1− α)g S βf + (1− β)h
8. subjective substitution: if f &S g and g &T h and S ∩ T 6= ∅, then f &S∪T g
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9. strict subjective substitution: if f S g and f T g and S ∩ T 6= ∅, then
f &ST g
10. interest: ∀t ∈ Ω, there exist prizes y and z in X such that [y] t [z]
11. state neutrality: for any two states r and t in Ω, if f(·|r) = f(·|t), g(·|r) = g(·|t)
and f &r g, then f &t g
Axioms (1) and (2) assert that preferences form a complete transitive order over the
set of lotteries.
Axiom (3) assures that only possible states are relevant to a decision-maker.
Axiom (4) asserts that a higher probability of getting a better lottery is always better,
and the following (5), built on the previous one, implies that any lottery ranked between
f and h is just as good as some randomization between f and h.
It is not diﬃcult to notice that if substitution axioms (6)÷(9) hold, then an intuitive
concept follows: if a decision-maker must choose between two alternatives and if there
are two mutually exclusive events, one of which must occur, such that in each event he
would prefer the ﬁrst alternative, then he must prefer the ﬁrst alternative before he learns
which event occurs. Axioms (6) and (7) events are objective randomization in a random
lottery process, on the other hand axioms (8) and (9) are for events which are subjective
unknowns. The diﬀerence from objective and subjective unknowns is that the former
implies that prizes depends on events that have obvious objective probabilities, the latter
is the case when an event has not obvious probability (e.g., result of a soccer match or
future course of the stock market).
Axiom (10) is just a regularity condition, which guarantees that the decision maker is
never indiﬀerent between all prizes.
Axiom (11) is optional and it asserts the decision-maker has the same preference
ordering over objective gambles in all states of the world.
1.1.2 Main theorems in Decision Theory
In this subsection we are only interested in giving some important results which follow
axioms we have written above, without any interest in writing demonstrations. These
theorems will be very useful in the following parts of the thesis, when we introduce the
Game Theory.
Let Ξ be the set of all events and p : Ξ −→∆(Ω) the conditional probability for every
state t ∈ Ω and every event S. Now we deﬁne an utility function u : X×Ω −→ R, which
we denote with U iﬀ it satisﬁes the condition of state independency U(x) = u(x, t)∀x, t.
Given any utility function u and any conditional probability p, we denote Ep(u(f)|S)
as the expected value of the prize determined by f
Ep(u(f)|S) =
∑
t∈S
p(t|S)
∑
x∈X
u(x, t)f(x, t).
Now, given p and u, a theorem gives us a quantitative interpretation of the hierarchy
of the lotteries in terms of the expected utility:
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Theorem 1.1.1 (Expected-Utility Maximization Theorem) Axioms from 1 to 10 are
jointly satisﬁed iﬀ there exist a utility function u : X×Ω→ R and a conditional proba-
bility p : Ξ→∆(Ω) such that:
1. maxx∈X u(x, t) = 1 and minx∈X u(x, t) = 0 ∀t ∈ Ω
2. p(R|T ) = p(R|S)p(S|T )∀R, S, T such that R ⊆ S ⊆ T ⊆ Ω and S 6= ∅
3. f &S g iﬀ Ep(u(f)|S) > Ep(u(g)|S)∀f, g ∈ L, ∀S ∈ Ξ
where p(R|S) ≡∑r∈R p(r|S).
Axiom (11) is also satisﬁed iﬀ all the results of this theorem holds for a state-independent
utility function.
The last point of the theorem is the most important and interesting, because it assures
that the decision-makers always prefers lotteries with the high expected utilities. In
addition we notice that, with X and Ω ﬁnite, there are only ﬁnite many utility and
probability numbers. Thus, the decision-maker's preferences over all the inﬁnite many
lotteries in L can be completely characterized by ﬁnite many numbers.
Since more than one utility function can satisfy the results of the theorem (1.1.1), we
write a theorem which makes us able to recognize such equivalent representations:
Theorem 1.1.2 (Equivalent Representation Theorem) Let S in Ξ be any given subjective
event and both the conditional-probability function p and the utility function u satisfying
the results of the theorem (1.1.1). Suppose that the decision-maker's preferences satisfy
axioms 1 ÷ 10. Then v and q represent the preference ordering ≥S iﬀ ∃ a number A ∈ R+
and a function B : S → R such that
q(t|S)v(x|t) = Ap(t|S)u(x|t) +B(t)∀t ∈ S, ∀x ∈ X
If we assume axiom (11) to hold and we require utility functions to be state-independent,
we eliminate the ambiguity on the probability function:
Theorem 1.1.3 Under the same assumptions of the theorem (1.1.2), if we add the axiom
(11) and the condition of state-independency on the utility function v, then
q(t|S) = p(t|S)∀t ∈ S
v(x) = Au(x) + C ∀x ∈ X
where A,C ∈ R and A > 0.
Let us focus now on the second result of the theorem (1.1.1), that is the Bayes'
formula. Contemporary we deﬁne ∆∗(Ω) the set of all Bayesian conditional probability
systems on Ω, and ∆0(Z) the set of all probability distributions on Z that assigns positive
probability to every element in Z. Any element in the set ∆0(Z) generates an element of
∆∗(Ω) through the relation
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p(t|S) =
{
pˆk(t)∑
r∈S pˆ(r)
if t ∈ S
0 if t 6∈ S
(1.2)
We stress that through (1.2) we are sure that, starting from an element of ∆0(Z) we get
an element of ∆∗(Z), but this does not implies that we generate all ∆∗(Z). Fortunately,
a theorem tells us how to do:
Theorem 1.1.4 The probability function p is Bayesian probability-system in ∆∗(Z) iﬀ ∃
a sequence of probability distribution {pˆk}∞k=1 such that, ∀ event S in Ω and ∀t in Ω
p(t|S) =
{
limk→∞
pˆk(t)∑
r∈S pˆ(r)
if t ∈ S
0 if t 6∈ S
A question may arise at this point: can we say that, independently from the present
state of the system, some decision-options are no optimal for sure? The answer that
sometimes we can say it, and in these cases we say that a decision-option is strongly
dominated.
As intuition suggests, we deﬁne a strategy y to be optimal if, given a state-dependent
utility function u : X×Ω −→ R where we interpret X as the set of decisions available to
the decision-maker, and given p(t) = p(t|Ω)∀t ∈ Ω as the subjective probability of each
state t ∈ Ω, then ∑
t∈Ω
p(t)u(y, t) ≥
∑
t∈Ω
p(t)u(x, t)∀x ∈ X. (1.3)
For the p of the relation (1.3) a geometrical property holds:
Theorem 1.1.5 Given u : X ×Ω −→ R and y ∈ X, the set of all p ∈ ∆(Ω) such that
y is optimal is convex.
Let us now ﬁnally give an example of a strongly dominated strategy: suppose X =
{α, β, γ}, Ω = {θ1, θ2} and the utility function to be as in table 1.1.
Decision θ1 θ2
α 8 1
β 5 3
γ 4 7
Table 1.1: The expected utility payoﬀ of decision-options {α, β, γ} depending on the states
{θ1, θ2}
It is easy to verify that the optimality condition (1.3) is satisﬁed for option α against
β and γ if p(θ1) ≤ 0.6, and for γ if p(θ1) ≥ 0.6, whereas it is never satisﬁed for β. For
this reason we say that β is strongly dominated.
If we deﬁne a randomized strategy σ any probability distribution over the set of deci-
sion options X, it is possible to ﬁnd in literature an alternative deﬁnition of a strongly
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dominated strategy which uses a randomized strategy σ = (σ(x))x∈X ∈ ∆(X) and the
usual utility function. According to this deﬁnition we say that an option y ∈ X is strongly
dominated by a random strategy γ iﬀ∑
x∈X
σ(x)u(x, t) > u(y, t)∀t ∈ Ω (1.4)
A theorem states that the two deﬁnitions are equivalent.
We can relax the condition (1.4), getting the deﬁnition of a weakly dominated option
y ∈ X ∑
x∈X
σ(x)u(x, t) ≥ u(y, t)∀t ∈ Ω
and there exist at least one s ∈ Ω such that∑
x∈X
σ(x)u(x, s) > u(y, s)
A theorem asserts that y ∈ X is weakly dominated by the random strategy σ if there
does not exist a distribution p ∈∆0(Ω) such as y is optimal.
1.2 Game Theory
In this section we extend concepts of Decision Theory to a situation with multiple decision-
makers, i.e. players, somehow interacting with each other. We recall that we are consid-
ering a system of rational and limited players, in the meaning of what we wrote at the
beginning of chapter 1.
1.2.1 The extensive and the strategic form
In representing schematically a game we have two possibilities:
 The extensive form Γe is a tree with notes at every step of the game. In correspon-
dence of every note two situations can occur, either it is a player's turn or the choice
is determined by a chance event. Each node is labelled by the name of the player
and the available information to him. The ending point of the tree is the end of the
game, and here a label with a utility function for every player ui is written. This
ui ∈ R is also called payoﬀ.
 The strategic form is a trio Γ = N, (Ci)i∈N , (ui)i∈N , where N is the set of players.
For a ﬁxed player i, Ci is the set of (pure) strategies, and ui is real utility function
acting on the space C = ×j∈NCj. In the following examples we will indiscriminately
talk about strategic and normal form. Precisely speaking this is not correct but, if
given a strategy proﬁle c = (cj)j∈N , we deﬁne the utility function for the strategic
form as the expected utility payoﬀ
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ui(c) =
∑
x∈Ω∗
P (x|c)wi(x)
where Ω∗ is the set of all terminal node of Γe, then the equality between the strategic
and normal description holds. P (x|c) is the probability that the game goes through
the node x, given the cumulative strategy c and starting from the initial point of
Γe.
Let us show some examples and how they can be schematised.
 the ﬁrst example is a card game: at the beginning players 1 and 2 put one dollar in
the pot, then player 1 picks a card from a deck with half red and half black card.
After picking player 1 can looks at his card privately and decide to raise or fold.
Player 1 wins the money in the pot if the card is red, player 2 wins otherwise. If
player 1 decides to raise putting another dollar in the pot, then the game continues
and it is player 2's turn. Options for player 2 are two: he can pass, so game ends
and player 1 takes the money in the pot, or meet putting a dollar in the pot. We
can describe this scenario in two diﬀerent but (obviously) equivalent ways, i.e. the
extensive (picture 1.1) and the strategic form (or normal representation) (table 1.2).
0
1.a
1.b
2.0
2.0
1,−1
2,−2
1,−1
−1, 1 −2, 2
1,−1
0.
5
0.5
F
R M
P
F
R M
P
Figure 1.1: The card game in the extensive form. Each colored point denotes a node in this tree
representation. The starting point is green and it is the root, then two branches follow leading
to two nodes corresponding to player 1's turn. All nodes corresponding to a player's turn, both
1 and 2, are yellow, and each yellow point is labelled by a number, which indicates the player
acting at that node, followed by a letter denoting the knowledge of the player about past events.
We notice that player 1 knows the color of the ﬁrst card, whose player 2 knows nothing, so the
latter cannot distinguish whether he is on the upper or lower branch. Finally terminal nodes are
red and correspond to the ways the game can end. Each available sequence of events is known
as path of play. Above arrows the decision made (or card picked in the initial node) is indicated.
 let us consider now a model in which player 2 can distinguish the past event and the
ﬁrst choice is not a chance one in order to introduce some variation to the card game.
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C2
C1 M P
Rr 0, 0 1, 1
Rf 0.5,−0.5 0, 0
Fr −0.5, 0.5 1,−1
Ff 0, 0 0, 0
Table 1.2: The card game in the strategic form. Strategies for player 1 are in the set C1 =
{Rr,Rf, Fr, Ff}, where the ﬁrst capitol letter is the choice in the red case and the second
lower one in the black case, on the other hand for player 2 only two strategies C2 = {M,P}
are available. Given a couple strategy the payoﬀ for player 1 and 2 is reported, separated by a
comma.
The extensive form of this model is shown in picture 1.2, whereas the strategic form
(or normal representation) in table 1.3.
0
1.a
1.b
2.0
2.0
1,−1
2,−2
T
B
L
R
l
r
Figure 1.2: Variation of the card game: no chance nodes are present and player 2 knows the
choice of player 1
C2
C1 Ll Lr Rl Rr
T 2, 2 2, 2 4, 0 4, 0
B 1, 0 3, 1 4, 1 3, 1
Table 1.3: The card game in the strategic form. Strategies for player 2 are in the set C2 =
{Ll, Lr,Rl,Rr}, where the ﬁrst capitol letter is the choice in the T case and the second lower
one in the B case, on the other hand for player 1 the only two available strategies are in the set
C1 = {T,B}
An obvious question might now arise: why have we deﬁned this two forms? Probably
the extensive form is the easiest to write, once we have the description of the game.
However, the strategic form can be considered as the static version of the extensive form,
which is the dynamic description. It follows that, if we are not interested in time, we
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can delete a dimension getting a simpler game. This rationing has been conﬁrmed by
Von Neumann and Morngenstern, who assert that, in a very general sense, the normal
representation is all what we need to analyze the game. This conclusion arises from the
assumption of rational players.
Generalizing what we have described in section 1.1, we can write that two strategic
forms Γ and Γˆ are fully equivalent iﬀ ∀ player i and ∀ probability distribution µ = µ(c)c∈C
(the probability of choosing the strategy proﬁle c) in ∆(C), and ∀λ ∈ ∆(C), a player i
would prefer µ over λ in both games. Other deﬁnitions of equivalence exist, but we are
not interested in listing them.
1.2.2 Simplifying a game
Let us consider a more complicated game, as shown in the extensive form in picture 1.3.
Our hope is that, once written in the strategic form (table 1.4), we will be able to ease it
in some way.
1.1
6.0
2.2
1.3
1.3
8, 0
0, 8
0
0, 8
6, 0
0, 8
8, 0
0
8, 0
6, 0
a 1
b
1
x2
y
2
x 1
y1
z1 0.5
0.5
x1
y1
z
1
0.5
0.5
Figure 1.3: The game in the extensive form.
After having written the game in the strategic form we notice immediately that the
subset of C1, given by {a1x1, a1y1, a1z1}, leads to identical payoﬀs, so that we can replace
C1 by its quotient getting the purely reduced normal representation as in table 1.5
After having deleted equivalent strategies we are now interested in checking if some
strategy is redundant, in the meaning that can be generated by other ones. In this sense
we can neglect the element {b1z1} because it can be obtained by a randomized strategy
0.5[a1·] + 0.5[b1y1], giving the payoﬀ
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C2
C1 x2 y2
a1x1 6, 0 6, 0
a1y1 6, 0 6, 0
a1z1 6, 0 6, 0
b1x1 8, 0 0, 8
b1y1 0, 8 8, 0
b1z1 3, 4 7, 0
Table 1.4: The game in the strategic form.
C2
C1 x2 y2
a1· 6, 0 6, 0
b1x1 8, 0 0, 8
b1y1 0, 8 8, 0
b1z1 3, 4 7, 0
Table 1.5: The game in the strategic form.
{
0.5(6, 0) + 0.5(0, 8) = (3, 4) against x2
0.5(6, 0) + 0.5(8, 0) = (7, 0) against y2
which is eﬀectively equal to the payoﬀ given by {b1z1}.
After having seen some strategies can be neglected in the case they are repeated, also
from the payoﬀ point of view we are now interested in knowing if it is possible to simplify
further the game using the hypothesis of rational player. Indeed, intuitively if some
strategy is always the worst we are led to think that it will be never chosen by players,
so let us say it is negligible too. This intuition is right and it is again a generalization of
concepts given in the section 1.1, even if it is necessary to distinguish from two kind of
dominated strategies.
Given a game Γ = {N, (Ci)i∈N , (ui)i∈N}, we say that a strategy di is strongly domi-
nated iﬀ there exists some randomized strategy σi ∈∆(Ci) such that
ui(ci, di) <
∑
ei∈Ci
σi(ei)ui(c−i, ei)∀c−i ∈ C−i
where C−i is the product of all each single player's strategies set Cj with j 6= i.
Weakening this requirement we get the deﬁnition of a weakly dominated strategy
ui(ci, di) <
∑
ei∈Ci
σi(ei)ui(c−i, ei)∀c−i ∈ C−i.
After eliminating a strongly dominated strategy other new strongly dominated ones
may arise, so that other eliminations may be possible. Due to our initial assumption
of rationality this iterative elimination of strong dominated strategies does not aﬀect
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the game. An obvious question is now if the elimination of weakly dominated strategy
let the game unchanged. The answer is negative. In addition the resulting game from
the elimination of the weakly dominated strategies depends on the order of elimination.
Probably the most important theorem about the diﬀerence in eliminating strongly or
weakly dominated strategies deals with equilibria, and for this reason it will be discussed
later.
1.2.3 Nash Equilibrium
From a intuitive point of you we can imagine that at a certain moment the game stabilizes
and each player ﬁnds a strategy he will never change in the future. This concept is better
explained and deﬁned in the following rows.
Given a game with rational players, we can assume that players' strategies are inde-
pendent random variables. We call σ a randomized strategy proﬁle and we denote with
(σ−i, τi) as the randomized-strategy proﬁle in which the i-component is τi and all other
components are as in σ. In other words σi(ci) represents the probability that player i
chooses ci the following equality follows
ui(σ−i, τi) =
∑
c∈C
( ∏
j∈N−i
σj(cj)
)
τi(ci)ui(c).
We can deﬁne a randomized strategy σ an (Nash) equilibrium iﬀ no player could in-
crease his expected playoﬀ by unilaterally deviating from the prediction of the randomized
strategy proﬁle:
ui(σ) ≥ ui(σ−i, τi)∀i ∈ N, ∀τi ∈∆(Ci) (1.5)
We stress that in this deﬁnition we have used the word unilaterally and, as we will see
in the ﬁnal example in subsection 1.2.5, this word is very important.
Nash equilibria can be (weakly) Pareto eﬃcient, iﬀ there is no other outcome that
would make all players better oﬀ. In addition more equilibria may be present.
After deﬁning the concept of the Nash equilibrium we are interested in ﬁnding it, or
simpler in knowing whether it can be found or not. A theorem which deals with this
problem was written by Nash:
Theorem 1.2.1 Given any ﬁnite game Γ in strategic form, there exists at least one equi-
librium in ×i∈N∆(Ci).
We stress that we are not considering only pure but also randomized strategies, in
eﬀect considering only pure strategies may be insuﬃcient.
As in physics, we can distinguish between stable and unstable equilibria: let us see
what these concepts mean in Game Theory. At ﬁst we start deﬁning the usual game
Γ = (N, (Ci)i∈N , (ui)i∈N) in strategic form. From Γ we can deﬁne a perturbation of this
game as Γˆ = (N, (Ci)i∈N , ((ui(δ~e,λ([·])))i∈N)) where δ~e,λ : ×i∈N∆(Ci) → ×i∈N∆0(Ci) is
deﬁned by δ~e,λ = σˆi. Given a vector ~e with every component satisfying the condition
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0 < ei ≤ 1, in the perturbed game every player i has an independent possibility ei of
implementing the randomized strategy λ ∈ ×i∈N :
σˆ = (1− ei)σi + eiλi. (1.6)
Before deﬁning a stable set of equilibria we need to deﬁne the so-called prestable set :
a closed subset of equilibria Θ of Γ is a prestable set iﬀ it is arbitrarily close to an
equilibrium of every perturbed game Γˆ~e,λ, ∀~e with suﬃcient small components and ∀λ.
From this deﬁnition if we require the prestable set to be minimal we obtain a stable set.
We report an important theorem, which assures us the existence of at least one stable
subset:
Theorem 1.2.2 For any strategic-form game, there is at least one connected set of equi-
libria that contains a stable subset.
In the previous subsection we have seen what happens generally to the game if we delete
weakly dominated strategies. Now we want to know what happens from the equilibria
point of view when we delete a weakly dominated strategy. The answer is that equilibria
of the simpliﬁed game are still equilibria of the original game. However, eliminating a
weakly dominated strategy, we may delete some equilibria too.
1.2.4 Classiﬁcation of Games
We can classify diﬀerent games according to their characteristics: a game with N players
is called a N-person game. If the sum of all gains is equal to the total amount of losses
we are dealing with a zero sum game, on the contrary it is a non-zero sum game. If
participants can communicate and they use this ability in order to cooperate to increase
their payoﬀs they are playing a collaborative game, otherwise it is a non-collaborative
game.
An important feature in games is the memory, which can be deﬁned as the basis on
which a player decides what option to play. Players can learn working on the memory, in
the sense that one changes his strategy over time if the previous one is working bad.
1.2.5 The Prisoner's Dilemma
In order to see some practical applications we present a ﬁrst example of a basic and classic
game: the Prisoners' dilemma. The original version has been written by Luce and Raiﬀa
in 1957, and after that many diﬀerent versions have been written.
The situation can be described as follows: there are two players who are arrested
because they are suspected of committing a crime. They are immediately separated, so
that they cannot communicate. Each player can confess or remain silent, if one confesses
and the other remains silent the confessor is free and the silent one goes to jail for 6 years,
if both confess, then both go to jail for 5 years, and ﬁnally if both stay silent, they go to
jail for only 1 year.
The strategic form of the game, where the payoﬀ is the number of years the player can
spend free with respect to the maximum punishment of 6 years, is written in table 1.6.
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C2
C1 s2 c2
s1 5, 5 0, 6
c1 6, 0 1, 1
Table 1.6: The Prisoners' dilemma in strategic form. Every player can confess (ci) or remain
silent (si). The payoﬀ is given by the number of years each player can spend in freedom, and it
spreads from 0, corresponding to 6 years in jail, to 6, corresponding to 0 years in jail.
We immediately notice the silence is always worse than the confession, irrespective of
what the other player does. Thus, we can say that si is always strongly dominated by ci.
This means that the only (Nash) equilibrium of the game is given by ([c1], [c2]). On the
other hand we notice that the cooperative choice, i.e. ([s1], [s2]) would lead to a better
payoﬀ for both players, indeed the equilibrium of this game is not Pareto eﬃcient. From
this remark we argue that, generally speaking, the elimination of strongly dominated
strategies does not lead to the best payoﬀ for each player.
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Chapter 2
The general Minority Game model
This chapter is devoted to introduce a ﬁnancial Game Theory model, i.e., the Minority
Game. At ﬁrst we present the El Farol Bar Problem, of which the Minority Game grew
out. In the following section 2.2 we deﬁne the Minority Game, both the basic model and
a speciﬁc version that we will modify in chapter 3 in order to take into account some
psychological aspects that inﬂuence players' behavior. The interpretation of the Minority
Game as a ﬁnancial market description is explained in subsection 2.2.2.
2.1 El Farol Bar Problem
We have already stressed that assuming players to be perfectly rational is too strong a
hypothesis for describing real interactions between people, speciﬁcally if we are dealing
with economic systems, in which players are inﬂuenced by emotions and the environment
cannot be rigorously deﬁned. In 1994, W. B. Arthur formulated a game [9] characterized
by a inductive reasoning, instead of a perfect deductive one, to formulate an eﬃcient
description of some complex economic systems.
He started considering some psychological studies which shew that people are not so
able to use a deductive reasoning: to face some complex situation, one prefers to shape his
decision scheme starting from some hypotheses that uses to verify continuously over time.
If the strategy one is using ceases to perform, one will replace it with a new one. This
behavior is perfect to describe an evolutionary context and it is a inductive reasoning.
The situation described below takes place in the bar El Farol in Santa Fe, which really
oﬀered Irish music on Thursday nights, and it was originally formulated as follows:
N people decide independently each week whether to go to a bar that of-
fers entertainment on a certain night. For concreteness, let us set N at 100.
Space is limited, and the evening is enjoyable if things are not too crowded-
speciﬁcally, if fewer than 60% of the possible 100 are present. There is no way
to tell the numbers coming for sure in advance, therefore a person or agent:
goes - deems it worth going - if he expects fewer than 60 to show up, or stays
home if he expects more than 60 to go.
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In the same article he stressed there are neither communication nor cooperation be-
tween players, and they all follow a pure inductive behavior, since the only information
available is the numbers who came in past weeks.
As reported in [2] the only way to face the problem is the inductive method. Indeed, if
a deductive solution existed, then each player would choose the same method. However,
if all players make the same decision, then all of them will fail. This argumentation shows
that no deductive solution exists.
The study of this problem through numerical simulations leads to a surprising conclu-
sion, i.e., the mean attendance converges to the capacity of the bar (ﬁgure 2.1). In other
words, the predictors self-organize into an equilibrium pattern.
Figure 2.1: Bar attendance in the ﬁrst 100 weeks [9].
2.2 Minority Game
As Arthur wrote in the preface of the book written by Challet, Zhang and Marsili [12]
The Minority Game grew out from my El Farol Bar Problem [...] To me,
El Farol was not a problem of how to arrive at a coordinated solution (although
the Minority Game very much is). I saw it as a conundrum for economics:
How do you proceed analytically when there is no deductive, rational solution?
[...] The physics community took it up, and in the hands of Challet, Marsili
and Zhang, it inspired something diﬀerent than I expected the Minority Game.
El Farol emphasized (for me) the diﬃculties of formulating economic behavior
in ill-deﬁned problems. The Minority Game emphasizes something diﬀerent:
the eﬃciency of the solution. This is as it should be. The investigation reveals
explicitly how strategies co-adapt and how eﬃciency is related to information.
This opens an important door to understanding ﬁnancial markets.
The ﬁrst formulation of game [8] deﬁnes a Minority Game as a play in which N (odd)
players participate. Time after time, each player i can choose between two options, i.e.,
buy or sell assets, denoted by 0 or 1 respectively. We store the number of player choosing
the option ai(t) = +1 in the function A1(t). One player wins if he is in the minority,
so the two extreme situations are when N − 1 players loss and only one wins, and when
(N + 1)/2 loss and (N − 1)/2 win.
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The quantity we are interested in studying is A1(t), and more precisely ﬂuctuations
of this variable which are the measure of the system's total utility. We say that the more
eﬃcient the system is the smaller ﬂuctuations are.
The bounded rationality is realized by limiting information every player can access to,
basically the memory string is ﬁxed to be M bits long. If we identify by I the possible
histories each player can distinguish, it is easy to ﬁnd that I = 2M . Thus, it follows
immediately that the number of strategies between a player can choose is G = 2P (table
2.1)
I G
00 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
01 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1
10 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1
11 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
Table 2.1: In the ﬁrst column all histories I accessible for each player (M = 2). In all other
ones all the stragies G based on the two history-bits.
The Nash equilibrium is generally hard to ﬁnd, so we now brieﬂy discuss the simplest
version of the game, that is M=0 and p[ai(t) = +1] = p[ai(t) = −1] = 0.5. As written
in [13], any state with |A| = 1 is a Nash equilibrium. Indeed, winners would decrease
their payoﬀ switching to the minority side, whereas agents in the majority would stay in
majority if they decide to change their decisions, because the aggregated decision would
change from A to −A as well.
Thus, the number ΩNE of Nash equilibria is
ΩNE =
(
N
N−1
2
)
+
(
N
N+1
2
)
(2.1)
Evolutionary Minority Game
We can build a more complex game, in which at the beginning every agent randomly picks
l strategies and at each time steps opts for a strategy randomly selected from its pool of l
options. One agent values each of his l strategies by assigning one virtual point to those
which would have won, so the best strategy is the one with the highest number of virtual
points.
If we measure the performance of each player by the number of times he wins, then we
can extend the basic Minority Game to include the Darwinist selection [8]: we can consider
a model in which after some time steps we worst player is substituted by a clone of the
best one, and the new player's performance is reset to zero. To keep a certain diﬀerence,
we introduce a possible mutation by allowing one of the strategy of the new player to be
randomly replaced by a new one. What arises from the analysis is that ﬂuctuations are
reduced and saturated, this implies the average gain for everybody is improved but never
reaches the ideal limit. The learning process is evident if we plot the temporal attendance
of A(t) as in ﬁgure (2.2).
18 CHAPTER 2. THE GENERAL MINORITY GAME MODEL
Figure 2.2: We see that the distance from equilibrium of A decreases with time as a result of
the learning process [8].
Adaptive Minority Game
Sysi-Aho, Chakraborty and Kaski [1417] introduced a new modiﬁcation: the learning
process is not realized by replacing the worst player with a new one, but players modify
their strategies periodically depending on their performances after time interval τ .
When we deﬁne the game we ﬁx a parameter f , that is a fraction of the total number
of players. If after the time interval τ a player is one of the worst f players, then he
adapts himself modifying his strategy. The adaptation mechanism is inspired by biology:
let us consider two parents, i.e., strategies si and sj. The adaptation consists of choosing
a random breaking-point and, trough this one-point genetic crossover, the children sk and
sl are produced (ﬁgure 2.3).
Figure 2.3: We see that the distance from equilibrium for A decreases with time as a result of
the learning process [2].
The measure of the total utility of the system can be expressed as:
u(xt) = [1−H(xt − xM)]xt +H(xt − xM)(N − xt) (2.2)
where xM = (N − 1)/2, xt is either equal to A1(t) or A0(t) and so xt ∈ {0, 1, 2, ..., N}.
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The utility function of the system is maximum as the highest number of players wins.
As a result of the analysis, ﬂuctuations disappear totally and the system stabilizes to
a state with the maximum of the utility function. In addition a dependence on τ arises,
that is, both very frequent adaptation and very slow adaptation lead to bad performances.
2.2.1 A Basic Minority Game
Other formulations of Minority Game are possible, so let us consider a model [18] with N
(odd) agents, each agent i can choose between two options ai(t) = ±1. The total amount
of these choices is stored in the aggregated decision variable A(t) =
∑N
i=1 ai(t). The payoﬀ
∆i(t) each player experiences is given by
∆i(t+ 1) = ∆i(t)− A(t)
N
(2.3)
and his choice is inﬂuenced by the probability function
p[ai(t) = 1] =
1 + tanh[Γ∆i(t)]
2
≡ p(t) (2.4)
To convince ourselves this model is a Minority Game let us assume that at a certain
time step t the probability p(t) is 1/2 and A(t) > 0. Thanks to equation (2.3) the score
of every player decreases (∆i(t+ 1) < ∆i(t)), so that the probability of choosing ai = +1
decreases as well. Since ai(t) = +1 was the choice of the majority, this is actually a
Minority Game. We stress the game is a minority one thanks to two conditions, i.e., p(t)
is a monotonic increasing function with respect to ∆i(t) and the aggregated decision A(t)
updates the score of a single player by being multiplied by a negative number.
This model can describe the behavior of a ﬁnancial market, indeed if we assume that
the log-price LV(t) evolves according to
LV(t+ 1) = LV(t) +
A(t)
N
(2.5)
Rewriting ∆i(t) = −
∑t
t′=0A(t)/N + ∆i(0), we see immediately that
∆i(t) = −LV(t) + ∆i(0) (2.6)
From this point of view ∆i(0) is the asset value of agent i and this equation describes
a model with N investors having each a value in mind for the price, and acting following
their suppositions.
Further ﬁnancial interpretation to the model will be given in the following subsection
2.2.2, and now we focus on listing main results obtained by the analysis of the model.
If all initial condition are identical and zero, that is ∆i(t) = 0, we can neglect the
index i and the conditional expected value of the score is
E[∆(t+ 1)|∆(t)] = ∆(t)− 1
N
E[A(t)|∆(t)]
= ∆(t)− tanh[Γ∆(t)]
(2.7)
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Thus, equation (2.3) becomes
∆(t+ 1) = ∆(t)− tanh[Γ∆(t)] + n(t) (2.8)
and n(t) is a white noise term, that is E[n(t)] = 0 and E[n(t)n(t′)] = δt,t′ (1− tanh[Γ∆(t)]2/N);
it vanishes is the limit N →∞.
Once we have found a ﬁxed point, i.e., ∆∗ such that E[∆(t + 1)|∆∗] = ∆∗, , for
verifying the stability we expand the dynamic near ∆∗
∆(t+ 1) ≈ ∆∗ + ∂∆(t+ 1)
∂∆(t)
∣∣∣∣
∆∗
[∆(t)−∆∗] (2.9)
so
∆(t+ 1)−∆∗
∆(t)−∆∗ ≈
∂∆(t+ 1)
∂∆(t)
∣∣∣∣
∆∗
(2.10)
It is evident that the derivative measures the rate at which the successive iterates
approach the ﬁxed point or diverge from it. Thus, the ﬁxed point is stable iﬀ the derivative
is included in the interval between −1 and +1. If its value is one of extremes of the interval
a further investigation needs.
Our model has a ﬁxed point, i.e., ∆∗ = 0. It can be demonstrated that it is stable
whether Γ < Γc = 2 and unstable otherwise. The critical value Γc has the property to
separate the region in which the time-average of ﬂuctuations 〈A2〉 is proportional to N ,
that is Γ < Γc, from the region where 〈A2〉 ∝ N2, that is Γ > Γc. This separation role of
Γc is evident if we simulate ﬂuctuations versus Γ (ﬁgure 2.4).
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Figure 2.4: The black line is the simulation for ﬂuctuations divided by N2. The yellow line is
the value of Γc, which is calculated analytically.
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2.2.2 Minority Game as ﬁnancial model
We have already given a connection between Minority Game and market in the previous
subsection (2.2.1), let us now discuss it a bit deeper [18].
One of the most usual and important assumption we use to make for a ﬁnancial market
is that the arbitrage opportunity does not exist. This feature is implemented in Minority
Game with the time-average of A to be zero.
The most diﬃcult question is if ﬁnancial markets are really Minority Games. Naive
common sense suggests that if everybody is going to buy, the price will raise and therefore,
buying is convenient. From this point of view markets should be rather similar to majority
games. On the other hand, one may argue that only the minority of agents who buy ﬁrst
win whereas the others lose. The problem with this approach is the calculation of the
payoﬀ of a single transaction. Thus, we change point of view and we try to think how
an agent makes a prediction about the future price, given the recent evolution of an
asset. Depending on expectations of agents we can distinguish between fundamentalists
(or contrarians), who perceive the market as a Minority Game, and trend followers, who
perceive it as a majority one. Let us now see why these names for classifying them.
We divide the trading process into three time steps:
 time t− : players know the value of the portfolio reached at the previous time step,
that is V (t − 1), and submit their choices on the basis of their experiences up to
time t−1. We stress that they have not any information about what decisions other
agents are making.
 time t: market aggregates orders ai(t) getting A(t) and gives the new price V (t) as
outcome.
 time t + : agents discover if their choices were successful and they learn updating
their experiences. They are ready for the next decision process that will start at
time t+ 1− .
Options available for any player are two and they have a precise meaning if we consider
them actions on a speculative market:
 ai > 0 means that agent i contributes with ai(t)$ to the the demand for the asset;
 ai(t) < 0 means that i sells −ai(t)/V (p− 1) units of asset.
Thus, the demand is given by D(t) = N + A(t)/2 and the supply by S(t) = N −
A(t)/[2V (t− 1)]. As usual the price is deﬁned
V (t) =
D(t)
S(t)
= V (t− 1) N + 1
N − A(t)
(2.11)
We have written each player evaluates his decision once the price has been updated.
The way they evaluate it is the payoﬀ ui(t):
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 the agent plays ai(t) = +1: he spends 1$ to buy 1/V (t) units of asset. If the
price of the asset increases, his choice is the right one. The payoﬀ can be deﬁned
the diﬀerence between the money he would gain selling tomorrow and what he has
spent today to buy the same asset amount, i.e.,
ui(t) =
V (t+ 1)
V (t)
− 1 (2.12)
 the agent plays ai(t) = −1: he decides to sell 1/V (t − 1) units of an asset gaining
V (t)/V (t− 1). If the price of the asset decreases, his choice is successful. Thus, the
payoﬀ is the diﬀerence between what he has gained selling a certain amount of an
asset today and how much he would spend to buy the same amount tomorrow, i.e.,
ui(t) =
V (t)
V (t− 1) −
V (t+ 1)
V (t− 1) (2.13)
If we now assume the expectation of each agent i to be
Ei[V (t+ 1)] = (1− ψi)V (t) + ψiV (t− 1) (2.14)
we see ψi > 0 implies that agents believe market prices ﬂuctuate around a ﬁxed
value, so that the future price is an average of past prices. These players are called
fundamentalists.
From equation 2.14, it is easy to ﬁnd that the expectation for the payoﬀ is

Ei[ui(t)|ai(t) = +1] = −2ψi A(t)
N + A(t)
(2.15)
Ei[ui(t)|ai(t) = −1] = 2ψi A(t)
N − A(t) (2.16)
Thus, we can generally write
Ei[ui(t)] = −2ψiai(t) A(t)
N + aiA(t)
(2.17)
Notice that if ψi > 0, then agents taking the majority action will receive a negative
expected-payoﬀ, whereas agents in the minority expect to receive a positive one. Hence,
if ψi > 0, then equation 2.17 reduces to the usual payoﬀ for a Minority Game. On the
other hand, ψi < 0 leads to a payoﬀ for Majority Game.
Let ∆V (t + 1) be the price diﬀerence V (t + 1) − V (t) and insert it in equation 2.14
obtaining
Ei[∆V (t+ 1)] = ψi∆V (t) (2.18)
From this viewpoint, if ψi > 0 agent i may be called contrarians since they believe
that the future price increment is negatively correlated with the last one. On the other
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hand, ψi < 0 is a characteristic of trend followers, in the meaning that they think the
price is following a monotonic trend and they prefer to stay in majority.
Since all players consider the same price history, expectations should converge. For
this reason we require all players to play either a Minority Game or a Majority one. So,
albeit with totally diﬀerent expectations and outcomes, both models provide a description
of market dynamics.
We brieﬂy outline that describing a generic Minority Game as physical system is
possible: the Hamiltonian of the system is described by the time average of the ﬂuctuations
< E[A2(t)] >. If we consider adaptive agents following an exponential learning (as in
2.2.1) this dynamics admits for a Lyapunov function, in the continuous limit. This result
is very important, since it turns the probability of studying the stationary state of a
stochastic dynamical system into that of characterizing the local minima of a function.
Since this function is an Hamiltonian, tools of statistical mechanics are available to treat
this problem.
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Chapter 3
The asymmetric gains/losses Minority
Game model
In the real world, as we have stressed in the preface, a pure mathematical attempt to
foresee the future may lead to wrong conclusions. In other words, we can say that the
derived value (utility) function of an individual does not always reﬂect pure attitudes
to money, since it could be aﬀected by additional consequences associated with speciﬁc
amounts [19]. Therefore, even if two events have the same probability to occur, generally
losses loom larger than gains. The reason is that the aggravation one feels losing a certain
amount uses to be greater than the pleasure he would have experienced if he had won the
same amount. Moreover, the aversiveness of symmetric fair bets generally increases with
the size of the stake [7], so that the utility function, deﬁned with respect to the starting
point, is concave for gains and convex for losses and it is not symmetric because it is
steeper for losses than for gains.
Figure 3.1: The utility function for a generic agent playing a game.
The aim of the variation we are introducing now to the model is to take into account
this diﬀerent attitude to sell or buy an asset, depending on if the decision one has made
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at the previous time step was successful or not. We want to stress that this approach has
never been implemented in the minority game models before.
The simplest way to include this asymmetry in minority game's payoﬀs is realized
simply by adding an asymmetry factor k, which puts more (or less) weight to losses, to
the standard model in section 2.2.1:
∆i(t+ 1) =

∆i(t)− A(t)
N
winners (3.1)
∆i(t)− (k + 1)A(t)
N
losers (3.2)
p[ai(t) = 1] =
1 + tanh[Γ∆i(t)]
2
≡ p(t) (3.3)
The agents play a Minority Game as long as k + 1 > 0, otherwise it is a Majority
Game. In addition, losses have more weight for losers than winners if k > 0.
According to the deﬁnition of minority game a player wins if his choice is minority
(A(t)ai(t) < 0), otherwise he loses (A(t)ai(t) > 0). For precision's sake no draw possibili-
ties are available, because N is an odd number. The splitting between winners and losers
can be easily realized through the Heaviside function
H(x) =
{
0 if x < 0
1 if x ≥ 0
so that equations (3.1) and (3.2) can be rewritten in a more compact form
∆i(t+ 1) = ∆i(t)− A(t)
N
(
1 + kH[A(t)ai(t)]
)
(3.4)
From this last equation we realize that the special case k = 0 is the standard symmetric
model we have already discussed.
In the following sections both numerical and analytical analyses will be given. After
getting familiar with the new model we will ﬁnd some general properties of the system, in
other words how the aggregate decision A(t) behaves with respect to the two parameters
(k, Γ) of the model and how they inﬂuence the stability of the ﬁxed point.
Before working analytically on the equation which describes the dynamic of the score
we get acquainted with the model by simulating the evolution of the score of a single agent,
focusing on the role of k and Γ (section 3.1). After that we will move the spotlight to the
time to equilibrium (section 3.2), that is the time the system needs to stabilize. This value
will be very important when we will look for general properties of the system (section 3.3)
using numerical simulations, indeed we will calculate them after this transition time. For
all the simulations the software R will be used.
3.1 General overview
If we focus on the single agent payoﬀ plotting the output of the code
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model<-function(N=101, k=1, Gamma=1, NIT=1000, agent2observe=1) {
x=rep(0,length=NIT)
Deltak=rep(0, length=N)
for(it in 1:NIT) {
p=(1+tanh(Gamma*(Deltak)))/2
r=runif(N)
a=(-1+2*(r<p))
A=sum(a)
theta = ( sign(A)==sign(a) )
Deltak=Deltak-A*(1+k*theta)/N
x[it]=Deltak[agent2observe]
}
return(x)
}
one can distinguish diﬀerent kinds of path, depending on Γ and k.
The role of the learning factor Γ is to quantify how the probability of choosing ai(t) =
+1 depends on the score ∆i(t), indeed we see that if Γ is very large, then the value of
tanh[Γ∆i(t)] will take almost only two values, ±1. This means that the payoﬀ jumps
between two values at every time step (ﬁgure 3.2b).
0 500 1000 1500 2000
−
1.
0
−
0.
5
0.
0
0.
5
1.
0
score of a single agent
Gamma=0.2, 0.7, 1 (black, red, green)
t
D
el
ta
(t)
(a)
0 100 200 300 400 500
−
1
0
1
score of a single agent
Gamma=2
t
D
el
ta
(t)
(b)
Figure 3.2: The score ∆i(t) of a generic agent with diﬀerent values of Γ. k = 1 is ﬁxed.
On the other hand, the role of k is to diﬀerentiate payoﬀs, depending on whether one
wins or loses. Varying this parameter we obtain the ﬁgure 3.3
One sees that, if k < 0, a strong drift characterizes the dynamics (ﬁgure 3.3). On the
other hand, if k > 0 the dynamics is rather random (ﬁgure 3.3a), but if k exceeds some
large value, then the payoﬀ jumps again between only two values (ﬁgure 3.3b).
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Figure 3.3: The score ∆i(t) of a generic agent with diﬀerent values of k. Γ = 1 is ﬁxed.
3.2 Time to equilibrium
As we have already written the aim of this thesis is to study the global properties of (3.4).
In order to get convincing results, all statistics have to be computed after the system
stabilizes.
The quantity we consider to ﬁnd this transition time is the exponential moving average
EMA(t) = (1− λ) EMA(t− 1) + λf(t) (3.5)
where
 f(t) is the value of the variable we are analysing;
 EMA is the exponential moving average;
 λ (0 < λ < 1) is the constant which modulates the EMA update.
Generally we will say the time to equilibrium is reached when the value of EMA pegs.
The evolution of EMA [A2(t)] is given by the code
teq1_0<-function(N=101, k=1, Gamma=1, NIT=1000, lambda=0.05) {
Deltak=rep(0, length=N)
ema_A2=rep(0, length=NIT)
for(it in 1:NIT) {
p=(1+tanh(Gamma*(Deltak)))/2
r=runif(N)
a=(-1+2*(r<p))
A=sum(a)
3.3. ANALYTICAL ANALYSIS 29
theta = ( sign(A)==sign(a) )
Deltak=Deltak-A*(1+(k-1)*theta)/N
if(it==1) ema_A2[it] = A*A
if(it!=1) ema_A2[it]=(1-lambda)*ema_A2[it-1]+lambda*A*A
}
return(ema_A2)
}
where all parameters of the function can be varied.
At ﬁrst we investigate the role of k in the behavior of EMA[A2(t)] with Γ = 1 (ﬁgure
3.4) and we see (ﬁgure 3.4a) that the shape of the line describing the evolution of A(t)
varies, depending on whether k > 0 or −1 < k < 0, so that
 −1 < k < 0: TEQ increases considerably with k, e.g., TEQ(k = −0.8) ∼ 500 and
TEQ(k = −0.1) > 2000 (ﬁgure 3.4b);
 k ≥ 0: TEQ does not depend on k (ﬁgures 3.4b and 3.4c).
Now, if we ﬁx the value of k and we vary Γ (ﬁgure 3.5) we see that
 −1 < k < 0, TEQ increases when Γ decreases, e.g., TEQ(Γ = 0.2) > 2000 and
TEQ(Γ = 0.8) ∼ 800 (ﬁgures 3.5c and 3.5d);
 k ≥ 0, TEQ is Γ-independent (ﬁgures 3.5a, 3.5b, 3.5e and 3.5f).
3.3 Analytical analysis
At ﬁrst we want to get an approximation of the dynamic of the score ∆i(t).
In order to get this, we have got to calculate the expected aggregated decision
E
(
A(t)
∣∣ {∆j(t)} ) = N∑
j=1
tanh[Γ∆j(t)]
=
tanh[Γ∆i(t)]
N
+
∑
j 6=i tanh[Γ∆j(t)]
N
=
tanh[Γ∆i(t)]
N
+
µ−i
N
(3.6)
where we have introduced the notation µ−i =
∑
j 6=i tanh(Γ∆j(t)).
However, the main diﬃculty is the calculation of the average of the conditional term
E
(
A(t)H[A(t)ai(t)]
∣∣ {∆j(t)} ) = E([A−i(t) + ai(t)]H ([A−i(t) + ai(t)]ai(t)) ∣∣ {∆j(t)} )
= p(t)E
(
A−i(t) + 1
∣∣ {∆j(t)} , A−i(t) + 1 > 0)+
+ [1− p(t)]E(A−i(t)− 1∣∣ {∆j(t)} ,−A−i(t) + 1 > 0)
(3.7)
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Figure 3.4: The behavior of the EMA[A2(t)] with diﬀerent k. Γ is set to 1 and all initial
conditions for ∆i are 0.
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Figure 3.5: The behavior of the EMA[A2(t)] with diﬀerent Γ. If not speciﬁed k is set to 1 and
all initial conditions for ∆i are 0.
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where Ai(t) =
∑
j 6=i aj(t). Without any additional assumption we cannot go further,
indeed generally ∆l(t) 6= ∆m(t) ∀l,m and this leads to
 E[∆l(t+ 1)|{∆j(t)}] 6= E[∆m(t+ 1)|{∆j(t)}]
 strictly speaking we cannot use the Central Limit Theorem (CLT) for the distribu-
tion of A−i(t) because E[al(t)|{∆j(t)}] 6= E[ak(t)|{∆j(t)}]
Through equations (3.6) and (3.7) , neglecting ﬂuctuations, one approximates ∆i(t+1)
(3.4) by its expectation, i.e.,
∆i(t+ 1) ' ∆i(t)− tanh[Γ∆i(t)]
N
− µ−i
N
+
− k
N
[
p(t)E
(
A−i(t) + 1
∣∣ {∆j(t)} , A−i(t) + 1 > 0)+
+[1− p(t)]E(A−i(t)− 1∣∣ {∆j(t)} ,−A−i(t) + 1 > 0)]
(3.8)
In order to get a deeper analysis of the dynamic of the model we have to add to the
model the condition that initial conditions are the same for every player.
3.3.1 Identical initial conditions
The basic case k = 0 is much easier to solve when all agents have the same initial
conditions, i.e., ∆i(0) = ∆(0) ∀i [18]. This is also the case here, indeed under this
assumption
E
(
∆i(1)
∣∣ {∆j(0) = ∆(0)} ) = ∆i(0)− tanh[Γ∆i(0)]
N
− µ−i
N
+
− k
N
[
p(0)E
(
A−i(0) + 1
∣∣ {∆j(t)} , A−i(0) + 1 > 0)
+[1− p(0)]E(A−i(0)− 1∣∣ {∆j(t)} ,−A−i(0) + 1 > 0)]
(3.9)
where µ−i [{∆j 6=i(t = 0)}] = (N − 1) tanh [Γ∆(0)].
As we wrote we are not allowed to use the CLT because generally µi 6= µj if i 6= j.
Anyway, if we plot the coeﬃcient
d1(t) =
∑
j 6=1|µ1(t)− µj(t)|
N − 1 =
∑
j 6=1|tanh[Γ∆1(t)]− tanh[Γ∆j(t)]|
N − 1 (3.10)
in order to understand how large the spread is between the diﬀerent µis we get the
ﬁgure 3.6 and its time average (after t = TEQ) is 0.3437831. Hence, we can apply the
CLT to A(t) considering E[al(t)|{∆j(t)}] = 〈ak(t)|{∆j(t)}〉 ∀l, k and we write always
tanh[Γ∆l(t)].
Under this approximation we obtain
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Figure 3.6: the dispersion coeﬃcient d(t).
E
(
1 + A−i(t)
∣∣ {∆j(t)} , A−i(t) > −1) ' +∞∫
−1
(1 + x)N [x; (N − 1)µ∆j(t), (N − 1)σ2∆j(t)] dx
(3.11)
E
(− 1 + A−i(t)∣∣ {∆j(t)} , A−i(t) < 1) ' 1∫
−∞
(−1 + x)N [x; (N − 1)µ∆j(t), (N − 1)σ2∆j(t)] dx
(3.12)
where
N [x; (N − 1)µj(t), (N − 1)σ2j (t)] = C exp
(
−(x− (N − 1)µj(t))
2
2(N − 1)σ2j (t)
)

C = 1√
2pi(N−1)σ2j (t)
µ[aj(t)({∆k(t)})] = µj(t) ≡ tanh[Γ∆j(t)]
σ2[aj(t)({∆k(t)})] = σ2j (t) ≡ 1− tanh2[Γ∆j(t)]
If now deﬁne the function Φ(x) as
z∫
−∞
1√
2piσ
e−
(t−µ)2
2σ2 dt
u= t−µ
σ=
z−µ
σ∫
−∞
1√
2pi
e−
u2
2 du ≡ Φ
(
z − µ
σ
)
(3.13)
we can write the equality
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z∫
−∞
1√
2piσ
te−
(t−µ)2
2σ2 dt
u= t−µ
σ=
z−µ
σ∫
−∞
1√
2pi
(σu+ µ)e−
u2
2 du
=
σ√
2pi
−e− 12u2∣∣∣∣∣
z−µ
σ
−∞
+ µΦ
(
z − µ
σ
)
= − σ√
2pi
e−
1
2
(z−µ)2
σ2 +
1
2
µ+ erf
(
z − µ√
2σ
)
(3.14)
Finally we can get back to (3.11) and (3.12) and through (3.14) we can rewrite them
obtaining the relation
E
(
1 + A−i(t)
∣∣ {∆j(t)} , A−i(t) > −1) = 1− Φ(−1− µ−i
σ−i
)
+
+ E
(
A−i(t)
∣∣ {∆j(t)} , A−i(t) > −1)
= 1− Φ
(−1− µ−i
σ−i
)
+ E
(
A−i(t)
∣∣ {∆j(t)} )+
− E(A−i(t)∣∣ {∆j(t)} , A−i(t) < −1)
= 1− Φ
(−1− µ−i
σ−i
)
+ µ−i +
σ−i√
2pi
e
− 1
2
(−1−µ−i)2
σ2−i +
− µ−iΦ
(−1− µ−i
σ−i
)
(3.15)
E
(− 1 + A−i(t)| {∆j(t)} , A−i(t) < 1) = −Φ(1− µ−i
σ−i
)
+ E
(
A−i(t)
∣∣ {∆j(t)} , A−i(t) < 1)
= −Φ
(
1− µ−i
σ−i
)
− σ−i√
2pi
e
− 1
2
(1−µ−i)2
σ2−i +
+ µ−iΦ
(
1− µ−i
σ−i
)
(3.16)
where

µ−i[A−i(t)({∆j 6=i(t)})] ≡ µ−i =
∑
j 6=i
tanh[Γ∆j(t)] (3.17)
σ2−i[A−i(t)({∆j 6=i(t)})] ≡ σ2−i =
∑
j 6=i
(1− tanh2[Γ∆j(t)]) (3.18)
Hence, under the assumption that all initial conditions are the same we have found
that we can approximate the score after the ﬁrst time step (3.9) with
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∆i(1) ' ∆i(0)− tanh(Γ∆i(0))
N
− µ−i
N
+
− k
N
tanh(Γ∆i(0))
2
·
·
[
1− Φ
(−1− µ−i
σ−i
)
+ Φ
(
1− µ−i
σ−i
)
+ µ−i +
σ−i√
2pi
e
− 1
2
(−1−µ−i)2
σ2−i +
−µ−iΦ
(−1− µ−i
σ−i
)
+
σ−i√
2pi
e
− 1
2
(1−µ−i)2
σ2−i − µ−iΦ
(
1− µ−i
σ−i
)]
+
− k
2N
·
·
[
1− Φ
(−1− µ−i
σ−i
)
− Φ
(
1− µ−i
σ−i
)
+ +µ−i +
σ−i√
2pi
e
− 1
2
(−1−µ−i)2
σ2−i +
−µ−iΦ
(−1− µ−i
σ−i
)
− σ−i√
2pi
e
− 1
2
(1−µ−i)2
σ2−i + µ−iΦ
(
1− µ−i
σ−i
)]
≡ ∆ˆi(1)
(3.19)
Consequently, as ∆ˆi(1) depends only on initial conditions and they are all equivalent,
we have that all ∆ˆi(1) are the same, so we can ﬁnd ∆ˆi(2) in the same way and so on at
all time steps.
Now, let us consider the new process, that is merely an approximation of the dynamic
of the model itself:
∆ˆi(t+ 1) = ∆ˆi(t)− tanh(Γ∆ˆi(t))
N
− µˆ−i
N
+
− k
N
tanh(Γ∆ˆi(t))
2
·
·
[
1− Φ
(−1− µˆ−i
σˆ−i
)
+ Φ
(
1− µˆ−i
σˆ−i
)
+ µˆ−i +
σˆ−i√
2pi
e
− 1
2
(−1−µˆ−i)2
σˆ2−i +
−µˆ−iΦ
(−1− µˆ−i
σˆ−i
)
+
σˆ−i√
2pi
e
− 1
2
(1−µˆ−i)2
σˆ2−i − µˆ−iΦ
(
1− µˆ−i
σˆ−i
)]
+
− k
2N
·
·
[
1− Φ
(−1− µˆ−i
σˆ−i
)
− Φ
(
1− µˆ−i
σˆ−i
)
+ µˆ−i +
σˆ−i√
2pi
e
− 1
2
(−1−µˆ−i)2
σˆ2−i +
−µˆ−iΦ
(−1− µˆ−i
σˆ−i
)
− σˆ−i√
2pi
e
− 1
2
(1−µˆ−i)2
σˆ2−i + µˆ−iΦ
(
1− µˆ−i
σˆ−i
)]
(3.20)
We will now study some properties of the dynamics of the approximated score ∆ˆi(t).
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Fixed point
Due to the deﬁnition, the ﬁxed point of our series satisﬁes the condition
∆ˆi(t+ 1)
!
= ∆ˆi(t) (3.21)
Thus, if we force this condition in our model we ﬁnd that it implies
0
!
= −tanh(Γ∆ˆi(t))
N
− µˆ−i
N
+
− k
N
tanh(Γ∆ˆi(t))
2
·
·
[
1− Φ
(−1− µˆ−i
σˆ−i
)
+ Φ
(
1− µˆ−i
σˆ−i
)
+ µˆ−i +
σˆ−i√
2pi
e
− 1
2
(−1−µˆ−i)2
σˆ2−i +
−µˆ−iΦ
(−1− µˆ−i
σˆ−i
)
+
σˆ−i√
2pi
e
− 1
2
(1−µˆ−i)2
σˆ2−i − µˆ−iΦ
(
1− µˆ−i
σˆ−i
)]
+
− k
2N
·
·
[
1− Φ
(−1− µˆ−i
σˆ−i
)
− Φ
(
1− µˆ−i
σˆ−i
)
+ µˆ−i +
σˆ−i√
2pi
e
− 1
2
(−1−µˆ−i)2
σˆ2−i +
· −µˆ−iΦ
(−1− µˆ−i
σˆ−i
)
− σˆ−i√
2pi
e
− 1
2
(1−µˆ−i)2
σˆ2−i + µˆ−iΦ
(
1− µˆ−i
σˆ−i
)]
(3.22)
If we calculate how the score in equation (3.20) evolves starting from ∆i(0) = 0 ∀i we
ﬁnd that
∆ˆi(t+ 1)|∆ˆi(t)=∆ˆj(t)=0 = −
k
2N
[
1− Φ
( −1√
N − 1
)
− Φ
(
1√
N − 1
)
+
√
N − 1√
2pi
e−
1
2
1
N−1 −
√
N − 1√
2pi
e−
1
2
1
N−1
]
= − k
2N
[
1− Φ
( −1√
N − 1
)
− Φ
(
1√
N − 1
)]
= 0
(3.23)
Therefore, ∆∗ = 0 satisfy the condition is a ﬁxed point of our model.
Generalizing what we have written in the previous chapter to the multidimensional
case, a ﬁxed point ∆∗i is stable if all eigenvalues of the Jacobian are real or complex
numbers with absolute value strictly less than 1.
At ﬁrst to simplify the reading we highlight the derivatives
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
∂
∂∆ˆj 6=i(t)
µˆ−i =
Γ
cosh2[Γ∆ˆj(t)]
(3.24)
∂
∂∆ˆj 6=i(t)
σˆ−i =
1
2
−2Γ tanh[Γ∆ˆj(t)]
cosh2[Γ∆ˆj(t)]
σˆ−i
⇒ ∂
∂∆ˆj 6=i(t)
σˆ2−i = −
2Γ tanh[Γ∆ˆj(t)]
cosh2[Γ∆ˆj(t)]
(3.25)
Finally, to compute the derivative of the score at the time t + 1 with respect to the
score at the previous time we calculate
∂
∂∆ˆj 6=i(t)
(
σˆ−i√
2pi
e
− 1
2
(−1−µˆ−i)2
σˆ2−i
)
=
1√
2pi
1
2
−2Γ tanh[Γ∆ˆj(t)]
cosh2[Γ∆ˆj(t)]
σˆ−i
e
− 1
2
(−1−µˆ−i)2
σˆ2−i +
− σˆ−i√
2pi
1
2
e
− 1
2
(−1−µˆ−i)2
σˆ2−i
∂
∂∆ˆj 6=i(t)
[
(−1− µˆ−i)2
σˆ2−i
]
=
1√
2pi
1
2
−2Γ tanh[Γ∆ˆj(t)]
cosh2[Γ∆ˆj(t)]
σˆ−i
e
− 1
2
(−1−µˆ−i)2
σˆ2−i − σˆ−i√
2pi
1
2
e
− 1
2
(−1−µˆ−i)2
σˆ2−i ·
·
−2(−1− µˆ−i) Γcosh2[Γ∆ˆj(t)] σˆ
2
−i + (−1− µˆ−i)2 2Γ tanh[Γ∆ˆj(t)]cosh2[Γ∆ˆj(t)]
σˆ4−i
(3.26)
∂
∂∆ˆj 6=i(t)
(
µˆ−iΦ
(−1− µˆ−i
σˆ−i
))
=
Γ
cosh2[Γ∆ˆj(t)]
Φ
(−1− µˆ−i
σˆ−i
)
+
+ µˆ−i
∂
∂∆ˆj 6=i(t)
(
1
2
+
1
2
erf
(−1− µˆ−i√
2σˆ−i
))
=
Γ
cosh2[Γ∆ˆj(t)]
Φ
(−1− µˆ−i
σˆ−i
)
+
+ µˆ−i
1
2
2√
pi
e
−
(
−1−µˆ−i√
2σˆ−i
)2
∂
∂∆ˆj(t)
(−1− µˆ−i√
2σˆ−i
)
=
Γ
cosh2[Γ∆ˆj(t)]
Φ
(−1− µˆ−i
σˆ−i
)
+ µˆ−i
1
2
2√
pi
e
−
(
−1−µˆ−i√
2σˆ−i
)2
·
·
− Γ
cosh2[Γ∆ˆj(t)]
√
2σˆ−i − (−1− µˆ−i)
√
21
2
− 2Γ tanh[Γ∆ˆj(t)]
cosh2[Γ∆ˆj(t)]
σˆ−i
2σˆ2−i
(3.27)
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∂
∂∆ˆj 6=i(t)
(
σˆ−i√
2pi
e
− 1
2
(1−µˆ−i)2
σˆ2−i
)
=
1√
2pi
1
2
−2Γ tanh[Γ∆ˆj(t)]
cosh2[Γ∆ˆj(t)]
σˆ−i
e
− 1
2
(1−µˆ−i)2
σˆ2−i +
− σˆ−i√
2pi
1
2
e
− 1
2
(1−µˆ−i)2
σˆ2−i
∂
∂∆ˆj 6=i(t)
[
(1− µˆ−i)2
σˆ2−i
]
=
1√
2pi
1
2
−2Γ tanh[Γ∆ˆj(t)]
cosh2[Γ∆ˆj(t)]
σˆ−i
e
− 1
2
(1−µˆ−i)2
σˆ2−i − σˆ−i√
2pi
1
2
e
− 1
2
(1−µˆ−i)2
σˆ2−i ·
·
−2(1− µˆ−i) Γcosh2[Γ∆ˆj(t)] σˆ
2
−i + (1− µˆ−i)2 2Γ tanh[Γ∆ˆj(t)]cosh2[Γ∆ˆj(t)]
σˆ4−i
(3.28)
∂
∂∆ˆj 6=i(t)
(
µˆ−iΦ
(
1− µˆ−i
σˆ−i
))
=
Γ
cosh2[Γ∆ˆj(t)]
Φ
(
1− µˆ−i
σˆ−i
)
+
+ µˆ−i
∂
∂∆ˆj 6=i(t)
(
1
2
+
1
2
erf
(
1− µˆ−i√
2σˆ−i
))
=
Γ
cosh2[Γ∆ˆj(t)]
Φ
(
1− µˆ−i
σˆ−i
)
+
µˆ−i
1
2
2√
pi
e
−
(
1−µˆ−i√
2σˆ−i
)2
∂
∂∆ˆj(t)
(
1− µˆ−i√
2σˆ−i
)
=
Γ
cosh2[Γ∆ˆj(t)]
Φ
(
1− µˆ−i
σˆ−i
)
+ µˆ−i
1
2
2√
pi
e
−
(
1−µˆ−i√
2σˆ−i
)2
·
·
− Γ
cosh2[Γ∆ˆj(t)]
√
2σˆ−i − (1− µˆ−i)
√
21
2
− 2Γ tanh]Γ∆ˆj(t)]
cosh2[Γ∆ˆj(t)]
σˆ−i
2σˆ2−i
(3.29)
It is easy to notice now that the our Jacobian is symmetric
A B B · · · B
B A B · · · B
B B
. . . · · · B
...
...
...
. . .
...
B B B · · · A
 (3.30)
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where
A ≡ ∂∆ˆi(t+ 1)
∂∆ˆi(t)
= 1− Γ
N cosh2[Γ∆ˆi(t)]
·
·
[
1 +
k
2
(
1− Φ
(−1− µˆ−i
σˆ−i
)
+ Φ
(
1− µˆ−i
σˆ−i
)
+
+µˆ−i +
σˆ−i√
2pi
e
− 1
2
(−1−µˆ−i)2
σˆ2−i − µˆ−iΦ
(−1− µˆ−i
σˆ−i
)
+
+
σ−i√
2pi
e
− 1
2
(1−µˆ−i)2
σˆ2−i − µˆ−iΦ
(
1− µˆ−i
σˆ−i
))]
(3.31)
B ≡ ∂∆ˆi(t+ 1)
∂∆ˆj 6=i(t)
= − Γ
N cosh2[Γ∆ˆj(t)]
+
− k
2
tanh[Γ∆ˆi(t)]
N
[
− ∂
∂∆ˆj(t)
Φ
(−1− µˆ−i
σˆ−i
)
+
∂
∂∆ˆj(t)
Φ
(
1− µˆ−i
σˆ−i
)
+
+
∂
∂∆ˆj(t)
µˆ−i+
+
∂
∂∆ˆj(t)
(
σˆ−i√
2pi
e
− 1
2
(−1−µˆ−i)2
σˆ2−i
)
− ∂
∂∆ˆj 6=i(t)
(
µˆ−iΦ
(−1− µˆ−i
σˆ−i
))
+
+
∂
∂∆ˆj 6=i(t)
(
σˆ−i√
2pi
e
− 1
2
(1−µˆ−i)2
σˆ2−i
)
− ∂
∂∆ˆj 6=i(t)
(
µˆ−iΦ
(
1− µˆ−i
σˆ−i
))]
+
− k
2N
[
− ∂
∂∆ˆj(t)
Φ
(−1− µˆ−i
σˆ−i
)
− ∂
∂∆ˆj(t)
Φ
(
1− µˆ−i
σˆ−i
)
+
+
∂
∂∆ˆj(t)
µˆ−i+
+
∂
∂∆ˆj(t)
(
σˆ−i√
2pi
e
− 1
2
(−1−µˆ−i)2
σˆ2−i
)
− ∂
∂∆ˆj 6=i(t)
(
µˆ−iΦ
(−1− µˆ−i
σˆ−i
))
+
− ∂
∂∆ˆj(t)
(
σˆ−i√
2pi
e
− 1
2
(1−µˆ−i)2
σˆ2−i
)
+
∂
∂∆ˆj 6=i(t)
(
µˆ−iΦ
(
1− µˆ−i
σˆ−i
))]
(3.32)
Before going further we introduce the circulant matrix as a n × n matrix satisfying
the property
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
c0 cn−1 · · · c2 c1
c1 c0 cn−1
... c2
... c1 c0
. . .
...
cn−2
...
. . . . . . cn−1
cn−1 cn−2 · · · c1 c0
 (3.33)
The meaning of circulant is easy explained realizing that this matrix is completely
speciﬁed by the ﬁrst column, in eﬀect all n − 1 remaining ones are given by a cyclic
permutation of the ﬁrst one. This special matrix has the useful property to have all
eigenvalues given by the relation
χj = A+B
(
ωj + ω
2
j + · · ·+ ω(N−1)j
)
(3.34)
where ωj = exp
(
ı2pij
n
)
,with the index j = 0, . . . , n− 1, are the n-th roots of unity and
ı is the imaginary unit.
After introducing this special type of matrix we notice that our Jacobian is not only
symmetric but circulant as well. According to the notation we have used to deﬁne the
circulant matrix, A is the element c0 and B al the remaining element of the ﬁrst column.
Thus, we can easy calculate that
χ0 = A−B
(
N−1∑
k=1
ωk0
)
= A+ (N − 1)B (3.35)
χj 6=0 = A−B
(
N−1∑
k=1
ωkj
)
= A+B
(
ωj − ωNj
1− ωj
)
= A−B (3.36)
Since χj 6=0 does not depend on j this has multiplicity n− 1 and we rename it as χ.
To check the stability of the ﬁxed point ∆∗ = 0, we need to calculate the Jacobian
(3.30) in it. This calculation leads to
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A = 1− Γ
N
[
1 +
k
2
(
1− Φ
( −1√
N − 1
)
+ Φ
(
1√
N − 1
)
+
+
√
N − 1√
2pi
e−
1
2
1
N−1 +
√
N − 1√
2pi
e−
1
2
1
N−1
)]
= 1− Γ
N
[
1 + k
(
Φ
(
1√
N − 1
)
+
√
N − 1√
2pi
e−
1
2
1
N−1
)]
= 1 + Γα(k,N)
(3.37)
B = − Γ
N
− k
2N
[
−2 1√
pi
e
1
2(N−1)
−Γ√2√N − 1
2(N − 1) + Γ+
−
√
N − 1√
2pi
1
2
e−
1
2
1
N−1
2(N − 1)Γ
(N − 1)2 − ΓΦ
( −1√
N − 1
)
+
+
√
N − 1√
2pi
1
2
e−
1
2
1
N−1
−2(N − 1)Γ
(N − 1)2 + ΓΦ
(
1√
N − 1
)]
= − Γ
N
− kΓ
2N
[
1√
pi
e−
1
2(N−1)
√
2
√
N − 1
(N − 1) − 2
√
N − 1√
2pi
e−
1
2
1
N−1
1
(N − 1)+
+2Φ
(
1√
N − 1
)]
= Γβ(k,N)
(3.38)
where we have introduced functions
α(k,N) = − 1
N
− k
N
[
Φ
(
1√
N − 1
)
+
√
N − 1√
2pi
]
= − 1
N
+ f(N)k
(3.39)
β(k,N) = − 1
N
− k
2N
[
1√
pi
e−
1
2(N−1)
√
2
√
N − 1
(N − 1) − 2
√
N − 1√
2pi
e−
1
2
1
N−1
1
(N − 1)+
+2Φ
(
1√
N − 1
)]
= − 1
N
+ g(N)k
(3.40)
to ease the notation.
The speciﬁc condition to satisfy for the stability is{
−1 < 1 + Γ(α(k,N) + (N − 1)β(k,N)) < 1 for χ0
−1 < 1 + Γ(α(k,N)− β(k,N)) < 1 for χ (3.41)
From the condition on χ0 we get:
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− 1 < 1 + Γ
[
− 1
N
− N − 1
N
+ (f(N) + (N − 1)g(N)) k
]
< 1 (3.42)
and from the one on χ
− 1 < 1 + Γ (f(N)− g(N)) k < 1 (3.43)
Since our approximations hold in the limit N → ∞ we can rewrite equations (3.42)
and (3.43) obtaining {
− 2
Γ
< − (1 + k
2
)
< 0 for χ0
λ = 1 for χ
(3.44)
From the ﬁrst one we get
Γ
(
1 +
k
2
)
< 2⇒ Γc = 2
1 + k
2
(3.45)
which, setting k = 0, recovers the case of the model without splitting [18]. From the
equality which deﬁnes the value of Γc it arises that k destabilizes the dynamics, in the
sense that in the limit of k →∞ all values of Γ make ∆∗ unstable (ﬁgure 3.7).
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Figure 3.7: The dependence of Γc on k. ∆
∗ = 0 is stable if Γ < Γc
If we simulate the case with k = Γ = 1 and N = 1001 we ﬁnd that χ0 = −0.53 and
χ = 0.99. Hence, ∆∗ is stable and it conﬁrms the validity of the approximation we have
made to ﬁnd Γc analytically.
Fluctuations of A(t)
We now want to investigate how the aggregated decision A(t) evolves in time.
3.3. ANALYTICAL ANALYSIS 43
Since the probability function is symmetric with respect to ∆i(t) = 0 we expect the
average in time
〈A〉 = lim
t0,T→∞
1
T
t0+T∑
t0
A(t) (3.46)
to be 0. In order to verify this we plot 〈A〉 and how it depends on Γ and k (ﬁgure 3.8)
From ﬁgure (3.8) we have the conﬁrmation that the approximation 〈A〉 ' 0 hold
generally for every value of the parameters of the game.
A second information about the average of A(t) is now necessary, that is the magnitude
of the ﬂuctuations
〈
A2
〉
= lim
t0,T→∞
1
T
t0+T∑
t0
A2(t) (3.47)
We want to check if the behavior reported in chapter 2 holds in this model as well. In
order to estimate this, the average 〈A2〉 is plotted in ﬁgure (3.9)
For k > 0 the behavior of ﬂuctuation is the same we have reported for the basic model,
i.e. the transition between the the state with 〈A2〉 ∝ N and 〈A2〉 ∝ N2 occurs at the
value Γ = Γc. On the other hand, for k < 0 the function is strictly decreasing.
At the end we can say that k > 0 destabilizes and k < 0 stabilizes the dynamics.
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Figure 3.8: The dependence of 〈A〉 with respect to Γ and k. If not speciﬁed Γ = 1.
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Figure 3.9: The dependence of the ﬂuctuation
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/N2 with respect to Γ and k. Dotted lines
identify the theoretical value of Γc as calculated in the limit N →∞.
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Chapter 4
Conclusion and perspectives
Adding to the basic model the splitting between gains and losses we have moved the
critical value of the learning rate. If we consider the case k > 0 no diﬀerences arise
between this variation and the previous standard model. For the case k < 0 a diﬀerent
behaviour occurs. Anyway, as already written, this new case is not particularly revealing
because it is a case in which the punishment for the winner is greater than the one for the
loser. A second step may be done by considering diﬀerent initial conditions, e.g., using
∆i(0) normally distributed and focusing on how the variance aﬀects the behavior of A(t).
About further developments one can strengthen the role of the gains/losses splitting by
diﬀerentiating the score through ∆+i (t) and ∆
−
i (t) and adding two more memory variables,
i.e., ρ+ and ρ−, introducing the model

∆+i (t)(1− ρ+)−
A(t)
N
1− ai(t) sgn(A(t))
2
(4.1)
∆−i (t)(1− ρ−)− k
A(t)
N
1 + ai(t) sgn(A(t))
2
(4.2)
where the total score for each player is given by the sum of ∆+i (t) and ∆
−
i (t) and the
probability distribution follows the usual law. ρ+ and ρ− determine how the new score
is related to the previous one, so that we expect them to inﬂuence the approach to a
possible equilibrium of the system.
This new model splits two cases depending on whether one wins
∆+i (t)(1− ρ+)−
A(t)
N
(4.3)
∆−i (t)(1− ρ−) (4.4)
or loses
∆
+
i (t)(1− ρ+) (4.5)
∆−i (t)(1− ρ−)− k
A(t)
N
(4.6)
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The special case ρ+ = ρ− recovers a model which is very similar to the one discussed
in chapter 3.
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